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PRACTICES OF STIGMATIZATION 
FRÉDÉRIC MÉGRET* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
According to one popular minimalist account, contemporary international 
criminal justice features strictly forensic goals: investigating crimes, prosecuting 
the accused, and guaranteeing a fair trial. However, the limited number of 
international criminal prosecutions makes it difficult to believe that repression 
could be the only goal of contemporary international criminal justice. There 
must be something beyond repression for its own sake; repression must be a 
means to an end. A variety of justifications are thus deployed. The language of 
deterrence, for example, offers a reassuringly utilitarian and instrumental 
rationale for criminal justice, one that deals in the harsh delivery of 
disincentives. Other justifications for contemporary international criminal 
justice include contributing to international peace and security, facilitating 
transition, establishing a historical record, and providing victims with relief. 
Yet behind this techno-legal façade lies a more potent and problematic 
conception of the actual goal of international criminal tribunals: to assign 
stigma to certain types of behavior. Given that the repressive rationale for 
contemporary international criminal justice is undermined by the scarcity of 
cases prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the somewhat 
symbolic dimension of its work, studying the stigma rationale may lead to a 
more realistic and ambitious account of the activity of the ICC, one that brings 
together sociological, criminological, and international relations (IR) 
approaches. Studying the stigma rationale will also help refocus attention from 
the accused or victims onto the society from which international criminal justice 
emanates and that, in turn, it helps shape. 
Stigma is a form of social opprobrium that is its own end and can thus be 
distinguished analytically from actual punishment (imprisonment, for example). 
In fact, although I will argue that stigma is inherently linked to the criminal 
process, it is not only or even necessarily a result of punishment. Nor is stigma 
the same as shaming. Stigma attaches to its target regardless of that target’s 
reaction to it: one can be stigmatized by society, even though one is not 
personally shamed. Stigma is not incompatible with other goals (such as 
retribution or deterrence), but it remains separate from them as a sociological 
consequence of the operation of a criminal system. 
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The conception of stigma suggested here is also not the same as the legal 
category acknowledged explicitly in some legal cultures as a component of guilt 
or sentencing.1 I will not examine, for example, the fairness of stigma as a 
function of a culture of rights as such, although I will consider this function in 
passing as a way of assessing, among other topics, the role of judges in the 
allocation of stigma. Nor will I consider the role that stigma might occupy in 
popular theories of punishment in criminal law. I will not investigate the 
individual and psychological dimensions of stigma and the role they may have 
in either deterrence or rehabilitation. 
Rather, I will focus on the more general sociolegal role of stigma: 
delineating socially acceptable and inacceptable behavior, forming a society’s 
deep sense of self, and constituting a society through the designation of its 
“other.” In order to do so, I begin by describing the theoretical inspiration for 
this article. In part I, I identify that inspiration as the classical criminology 
inaugurated by French sociologist Emile Durkheim and its insistence on the 
role of stigma in constituting society.2 However, in line with this symposium 
issue, I emphasize the insufficiency of Durkheim’s structural and holistic focus, 
and the need to understand stigma not just as a reflexive product of society, but 
as the result of a series of institutional “practices”3 of stigmatization by various 
international criminal justice actors. In part II, I analyze some of these 
“practices” of stigmatization by identifying their actors, methods, and status, in 
an effort to highlight their specific rationality. In part III, I focus on the way in 
which targets of stigmatization also have agency and may react to that stigma in 
ways that complicate the overall picture. I conclude in part IV with some 
further thoughts on where a stigma-focused theory of international criminal 
justice might lead us. 
II 
STIGMA: FROM “CONSCIENCE COLLECTIVE” TO MICROPRACTICES 
A. Durkheim and the Constitutive Function of Stigma 
This article is founded on some well-known insights into the sociology of 
deviance, particularly as conceived by the founding father of sociology, Emile 
Durkheim. The relevance of Durkheim for our understanding of processes of 
international criminal and transitional justice was first highlighted by Mark 
 
 1.  See generally Alan Brudner, Proportionality, Stigma and Discretion, 38 CRIM. L. Q. 302 (1995) 
(discussing the requirement under Canadian law that stigma associated with criminal penalties is 
proportional to moral fault); Nancy K. Thomson, Fundamental Justice, Stigma and Fault, 52 U. 
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 379 (1993) (discussing stigma as a component of fault under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms).  
 2.  See generally ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (George Simpson 
trans., The Free Press, 1947) [hereinafter DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY]. 
 3.  See Jens Meierhenrich, The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical Analysis, 76 Law & 
Contemp. Probs., nos. 3–4, 2013 at 1, 10–27. 
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Osiel.4 Instead of asking what criminal justice does to the accused, Durkheim 
uses the sociology of deviance to examine how criminal justice affects society.5 
Durkheim’s central idea was that the criminal process is, fundamentally, a 
manifestation of the “collective conscience.”6 What shocks us about the 
commission of crimes is not that they are crimes, but that their commission 
contradicts our deeply held beliefs. This contradiction must be met by strong 
disapproval.7 
The heart of the criminal process, therefore, lies neither in the deterrent 
effect of punishment nor in criminal procedure. Rather punishment, as “the 
soul of penality,” consists in a “passionate reaction of graduated intensity”8 
through which society condemns what it cannot tolerate or in a sense exhausts 
itself as a society.9 
In this context, punishment 
does play a useful role. Only this role is not where we ordinarily look for it. It does not 
serve, or else only serves quite secondarily, in correcting the culpable or in 
intimidating possible followers. From this point of view, its efficacy is justly doubtful 
and, in any case, mediocre. Its true function is to maintain social cohesion intact, while 
maintaining all its vitality in the common conscience. Denied so categorically, it would 
necessarily lose its energy, if an emotional reaction of the community did not come to 
compensate its loss, and it would result in a breakdown of social solidarity. It is 
necessary, then, that it be affirmed forcibly at the very moment when it is 
contradicted, and the only means of affirming it is to express the unanimous aversion 
which the crime continues to inspire, by an authentic act which can consist only in 
suffering inflicted upon the agent. Thus, while being the necessary product of the 
causes which engender it, this suffering is not a gratuitous cruelty. It is the sign which 
witnesses that collective sentiments are always collective, that the communion of 
spirits in the same faith rests on a solid foundation, and accordingly, that it is repairing 
the evil which the crime inflicted upon society.
10
 
The specificity of modern criminal-justice systems is that this collective 
reaction is exercised “through the medium of a body acting upon those of its 
members who have violated certain rules of conduct.”11 In other words, 
tribunals are the tools of society’s condemnation, through which society 
experiments its unity.12 In another key passage in The Division of Labor in 
 
 4.  MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1999). 
 5.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 70–108. 
 6.  Id. at 80–81.  
 7.  Id. at 81 (“[W]e must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it is 
criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience.”). 
 8.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 90.  
 9.  Id. at 97–98 (“[W]hen it is a question of a belief which is dear to us, we do not, and cannot, 
permit a contrary belief to rear its head with impunity. Every offense directed against it calls forth an 
emotional reaction, more or less violent, which turns against the offender. We inveigh against it, we 
work against it, we will to do something to it, and the sentiments so evolved cannot fail to translate 
themselves into actions. We run away from it, we hold it at a distance, we banish it from our society, 
etc.”).  
 10.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 108.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 2 
(1993). 
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Society, Durkheim conceptualizes the relationship between the “collective 
conscience” and actual institutions of justice.13 He thus prefigures the sort of 
enterprise that not only produces the ICC, but also is produced by it: 
[W]herever a directive power is established, its primary and principal function is to 
create respect for the beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that is, to defend the 
common conscience against all enemies within and without. It thus becomes its 
symbol, its living expression in the eyes of all. Thus, the life which is in the collective 
conscience is communicated to the directive organ as the affinities of ideas are 
communicated to the words which represent them, and that is how it assumes a 
character which puts it above all others. It is no longer a more or less important social 
function; it is the collective type incarnate. It participates in the authority which the 
latter exercises over consciences, and it is from there that it draws its force.
14
 
This fundamentally shapes the dialectical relation of the criminal law to society 
in a novel way: The criminal law does not exist because society (pre)exists; 
rather society exists because criminal law exists. Therefore, a society without 
criminal law is one that is not really a society, because it does not have an 
“other.” 
The Durkheimian equation is a radical one for lawyers, because it draws 
attention away from what practitioners and law-oriented scholars of criminal 
justice are typically interested in, namely, the extent to which society produces 
criminal law and not the other way around.15 The Durkheimian attention to 
stigma reveals that—contrary to a widespread view—it is not just crime that 
derives from the existence of society but also society that derives from the 
existence of crime. In other words, stigma is both an expression of the inherent 
moral blameworthiness assigned to the perpetrators of certain heinous acts and 
a way of constituting the society that assigns this blameworthiness. “We can 
thus say without paradox”—according to Durkheim—“that punishment is 
above all designed to act upon upright people, for, because it serves to heal the 
wounds made upon collective sentiments, it can fill this role only where these 
sentiments exist, and commensurately with their vivacity.”16 
In other words, punishment has less to do with the fate of the accused or the 
protection of society (in the sense that social-defense theorists typically 
understand it) than with society’s pure expressivist urge to manifest itself to 
itself. This proposition underscores the need to think fundamentally backwards 
about the relationship of society to stigma, or at least about the mutually 
constitutive relationship between both. It also highlights, again in tension with 
traditional lawyerly concerns with the concrete operation of the criminal system 
or its broader goals, the deep moral and emotional function of criminal justice. 
 
 13.  Id. at 84.  
 14.  Id. at 84. 
 15.  For examples of this view, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 
(1959); PHILLIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW (2001). 
 16.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 108–09.  
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B. The Challenge of the International 
If for Durkheim the criminal law and stigma answers the question, what 
holds societies together? then one must wonder whether international criminal 
law and stigma are at least part of what keeps international society together, or 
perhaps even brings it together in the first place. One potential obstacle to 
transposing Durkheimian theory on the international realm is the radically 
different nature of that realm. There is a world of difference between what 
Durkheim sought to understand—the transition of France in particular from a 
rural to an industrial country in the late nineteenth century17—and the 
transformations of the international stage. Can one really place international 
criminal justice within the broader sociology of deviance? 
Although it is clear that Durkheim was not interested in international 
criminal justice or, for that matter, international relations, it is also clear that he 
meant his study of the fundamental character of crime in society as one that 
could be applied to all societies. Indeed, The Division of Labor in Society is 
replete with references to other eras and societies, which tend to prove rather 
than contradict Durkheim’s fundamental intuition.18 Yet there is also 
undeniably a specificity to international society, as a society of states that is only 
imperfectly a society in the strict sense,19 and whose existence cannot be as 
easily presumed as it is in state-focused classical sociology. For what are the 
common values that bind international society as surely as domestic societies 
are bound, and can they make up for international society’s relative anomie and 
lack of interdependence? Internationally, criminal justice cannot be seen as 
merely an effort to restore the moral force of the “collective conscience”; it is 
better seen as both a consequence and a cause of its existence, part of a process 
that makes society and criminal justice coconstitutive to the point where it is 
almost impossible to understand which came first.20 In effect, the relation 
between international society and criminal justice is dialectical: International 
society exists only inasmuch as it can react sufficiently strongly, through 
criminal justice, to what challenges it at its core; and the more it does so, the 
more it can be said to actually betray that it really exists. Thus, Durkheimian 
analysis is probably, in its broad intuition, compatible with the international 
project of criminalization, one that purposefully seeks to manifest a society’s 
very conditions of its existence. 
Indeed, compared to the endless chicken-and-egg debate about which comes 
first—society or the criminal law—and in particular the old but biting realist 
critique that an international criminal law without an existing society is an 
 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at 75–78, 91–94.  
 19.  See generally HEDLEY BULL, ANDREW HURRELL & STANELY HOFFMANN, THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (2002). 
 20.  Note that this has always been seen as true even of some foundational domestic criminal trials, 
perhaps the most notable example being Eichmann’s prosecution in Jerusalem. See SEGEV TOM, THE 
SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 328–338 (Haim Watzman trans., 1993). 
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impossible abstraction,21 Durkheimian thought informs the debate in a much 
subtler fashion. International criminal law is in a sense the manifestation of an 
international society’s will to exist and is constitutive of what some traditionally 
thought it could merely be declarative of. It seeks to affirm fundamental values 
of an international society in the making through international trials that 
embody an evolving international “collective conscience.” 
In that respect, it is worth noting that international criminal law has long 
had a role in “constituting” international society. International crimes are 
neither just international, nor are they simply grave; they are arguably crimes 
that target the essence of what makes, at any given moment, the fabric of 
humanity. For example, the “enemy of mankind” notion derives from a long 
genealogy of such designations that goes at least as far back as the notion of 
“pirate.”22 The very origin of international criminal law lied in its designation of 
pirates as hostes humanis generis.23 That designation of piracy as not just a 
violation of international law, but a shameful one at that, had a key role in 
establishing and consecrating, by way of contrast with the crime, the existence 
of a peaceful society ordered around the needs of commerce and freedom of the 
seas.24 It highlighted the particular position of pirates as deviants motivated by 
greed, knowing of no national allegiance and in a sense challenging states’ 
monopoly on the use of legitimate force. Later on, the designation of the slaver 
as a pirate would reinforce the international community’s emerging 
humanitarian sensitivity, at least as it expressed itself in fighting the slave 
trade.25 
C. The Move to Practice Theory 
For all its significant merit, the Durkheimian sociology of crime is 
predominantly functionalist and holistic. Durkheim is often credited for the 
insight that a society is more than the sum of its parts, that it speaks as a whole, 
as it were.26 The “conscience collective”27 has a transcendent feel to it, the origin 
of which is unclear. There is a sense in which the “collective conscience” is a 
sort of all-powerful, immanent force protecting society on its own, as evident in 
the following passage: 
 
 
 21.  See Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 263, 295–96 (1950) (arguing that without an overriding international authority, 
international criminal law is a legal fiction).  
 22.  ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 177 (3rd ed. 2007). 
 23.  See generally Jacob Sundberg, The Crime of Piracy, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
SOURCES, SUBJECTS AND CONTENTS 799 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008). 
 24.  See generally EFTHYMIOS PAPASTAVRIDIS, THE INTERCEPTION OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH 
SEAS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LEGAL ORDER OF THE OCEANS (2013). 
 25.  See JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 114–40 (2011). 
 26.  See, e.g., Raul Magni-Berton, Holisme Durkheimien et Holisme Bourdieusien. 58 L’ANNÉE 
SOCIOLOGIQUE 299 (2008) (Fr.). 
 27.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 86.   
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Once constituted . . . [the directive power,] without freeing itself from the source 
whence it flows and whence it continues to draw its sustenance . . . nevertheless 
becomes an autonomous factor in social life, capable of spontaneously producing its 
own movements without external impulsion, precisely because of the supremacy which 
it has acquired. Since, moreover, it is only a derivation from the force which is 
immanent in the collective conscience, it necessarily has the same properties and 
reacts in the same manner, although the latter does not react completely in unison. It 
repulses every antagonistic force as would the diffuse soul of society, although the 
latter does not feel this antagonism, or rather, does not feel it so directly.
28
 
As a result, Durkheim’s focus on stigma as a factor in society’s coagulation left 
very little space for the study of the production of stigma by actual actors and 
institutions. Durkheim, in fact, seemed to reduce the many actors of the 
criminal-justice system to mere mouthpieces for the “conscience collective”29 in 
ways that minimized their agency. This led him to be particularly evasive on the 
question of the power that lies behind and constitutes the criminal-justice 
system, often treating it as one that has a sort of abstract will of its own, with the 
“collective conscience” as the linchpin of a quasi-religious system. 
Conversely, an emphasis on the practices of the ICC can supplement the 
Durkheimian analysis by highlighting stigma not only as a transcendent 
phenomenon, but as an object produced by a multiplicity of actors in the 
international criminal-justice system (whether deliberately or unconsciously). 
Theories of practice30 have the merit of highlighting how the production of 
fields is always the result of certain embodied practices, typically based on 
shared understandings about what it means to be involved in those fields. 
Although something bigger than the actors expresses itself and is reinforced by 
processes of stigmatization—stigma does operate at a macrosocial level—this 
does not mean that stigma is merely a mechanical by-product of criminal justice, 
or that its actors have no role in mediating its production. On the contrary, 
agents of the international criminal-justice system interact dialectically with the 
sort of structural demands implicit in Durkheimian theory, in both producing 
and containing stigma. In fact, what is needed in the ICC context is a concept of 
agency that extends beyond the strict institutional actors in international 
criminal justice (judges and prosecutors) to include victims, states, civil society, 
and even the accused themselves. Moreover, stigma must be conceptualized as 
something that is also a by-product of a set of routinized practices and implicit 
know-how. Practice theory, with its emphasis on what competent practitioners 
do, on action rather than representation, provides some of the crucial missing 
elements beyond grand and structural narratives about international criminal 
justice.31 
 
 28.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2 at 84–85.  
 29.  Id. at 84.   
 30.  See generally INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES (Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot eds., 2011); 
DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK, AND ORGANIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION (2013); 
THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds., 2001); Vincent 
Pouliot, The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities, 62 INT’L ORG. 257 
(2008).  
 31.  See generally Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot, International Practices: Introduction and 
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One key point is worth further exploring here. Practice theory in general 
might seem an awkward paradigm for the law. After all, the law has its own 
theory of its practice, one rooted in explicit understandings of what it means to 
do law that foreground “interpreting,” “applying,” or “enforcing” it. The 
framing of a moral charge against particular individuals hardly features among 
these ways of understanding the law’s operation. Invocation of practice theories 
might even be suspicious because it does not necessarily correspond to what 
lawyers recognize as their own. In this respect, one evident question is, To what 
extent do the participants in international criminal-justice system consider 
themselves stigma entrepreneurs, or at least as willy-nilly involved in processes 
of stigmatization? Is the prosecutor of the ICC the more-or-less-unwitting heir 
to Durkheim’s ghost? Or, to adapt a famous quote from Keynes, to what extent 
are “[p]ractical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences . . . usually the slaves of some defunct [sociologist]?”32 
Stigmatization is probably not a “practice” that most ICC lawyers 
spontaneously think of themselves as being engaged in. “Professionally 
scrupulous lawyers” engage in prosecutorial, adjudicatory, procedural, and 
substantive practices, and do not see themselves as social and historical 
demigods promoting grand constitutive narratives.33 Stigmatization might 
appear at best as a rather distant sociological characterization, a typically 
“external” rather than “internal” portrayal, missing the importance for lawyers’ 
identity of the idea of simply adhering to the law. In fact, there may be a very 
real distaste for the idea that international criminal justice is about 
stigmatization, a function that is associated with primitive retributory variants 
of the criminal process. Moreover, how can stigmatization be a “practice” (at 
least in the sense of practice theories), if it is not codified and self-consciously 
performed? 
On the other hand, nothing in the theory of practices suggests that they must 
be absolutely (or indeed at all) deliberate and consciously performed. In fact, 
quite the contrary seems to be the case. The notion of “habitus” in practice 
theory has been described as the “embodied stock of unspoken know-how, 
learned in and through practice” that is “tacit and inarticulate.”34 The focus on 
practices of stigmatization might be revealing precisely in the sense that it 
allows us to conceptualize what international criminal lawyers really do, what 
their social function is beyond the law’s own rhetoric about itself, and, as it 
were, its ideological self-presentation. If practice theory is confined to 
deliberate, consciously performed practices, then it becomes virtually 
indistinguishable from the study of the legal rules that are supposed to guide the 
action of participants in the legal process (and thus also becomes redundant and 
 
Framework, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES 3 (Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot eds., 2011). 
 32.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY 383 (MacMillan & Co. 1947).  
 33.  OSIEL, supra note 4, at 17. 
 34.  Adler & Pouliot, supra note 31, at 15. 
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unhelpful). Much of practice theory, conversely, has recognized how practices 
operate at the level of the tacit know-how,35 or perhaps as a “know-about” in 
the sense of knowing what the enterprise is really about rather than just how to 
manage it. The focus on practices of stigmatization may highlight what Nicolini 
has described as a “horizon of intelligible action”36 for practitioners of 
international criminal justice, one that is a powerful rationalization of what 
international criminal lawyers do, and sustains a strong feeling of community, 
identity, and professional meaningfulness. 
Moreover, there is certainly a sense that many observers of international 
criminal justice see it as producing stigma in ways that result from strategic and 
tactical practices.37 Although international criminal practitioners might not 
formulate it quite like this, an ongoing participation in practices of 
stigmatization probably comes close to what at least an elite segment of the 
profession (the prosecutor of the ICC, for example) thinks of itself, perhaps in 
its less guarded moments, as doing. Certainly, given the degree of stigma 
effectively produced by an institution such as the ICC, it would be striking if its 
practitioners turned out to be unaware of this dimension of their work and, 
indeed, had not reflectively developed a sophisticated craft of stigma 
manipulation. In the following parts, my hypothesis will therefore be that 
stigma serves as a broad, implicit orientation of the practices of actors in the 
criminal-justice system, one that in fact makes better sense of what the ICC is 
involved in. Stigmatization practices, then, describe the totality of practices 
engaged in by various actors of international criminal justice that aim to 
produce, channel, or deflect stigma. Further, I will argue that the accumulation 
of these practices, both deliberate and unarticulated or subconscious, effectively 
helps the ICC become the powerful vehicle for stigmatization and international 
social regeneration that it is and thus provides a horizon within which the 
meaning of the court in international relations and law can be better 
understood. 
II 
SITUATING STIGMA 
The power to allocate stigma is a considerable one. Practices of 
international criminal justice suggest a world in which significant capital is 
gained by being able (and being seen as able) to target stigma. The question, 
 
 35.  Pouliot, supra note 30, at 266–67. 
 35.  Adler & Pouliot, supra note 31, at 15. 
 36.  NICOLINI, supra note 30, at 5. 
 37.  The role of the prosecutor as a “great stigmatizer” is one that is evident in the literature. See 
Payam Akhavan, Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentive to Peace?: Reconciling Judicial 
Romanticism with Political Realism, 31 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 624 (2009); Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of 
a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 801, 825, 869–870 (2006); Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: 
Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 481, 489 
(2003). 
8 MEGRET (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2014  11:34 AM 
296 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:287 
then, is how stigma is allotted, considering the huge stakes not only for the 
constitution of international society but also for the exercise of power in the 
international sphere. It is here that attention to particular practices can help us 
to “situate” stigmatization as a particular form of practice. Specifically, the 
allocation of stigma must be understood as a professionally specific, both shared 
and contested understanding of who can legitimately allocate stigma (addressed 
in part II.A), when (part II.B), and by what methods (part II.C). 
A. Actors 
Stigma is, as already hinted, not the univocal manifestation of a 
transcendent collective conscience but the result of a set of practices engaged in 
by a great many actors involved in international criminal justice. These actors 
are often part of an intense ongoing competition for the legitimate allocation of 
stigma. The prosecutor of the ICC (or, beyond her, of most other international 
criminal tribunals) is of course the demiurge of stigma, in that a prosecutor 
alone can be cause for shunning and shaming. More importantly, the prosecutor 
has the upper hand in launching the process of designating what is most worth 
stigmatizing, and therefore has a considerable power in the global economy of 
shame. It is she who will typically be criticized if certain states, groups, crimes, 
or victims are insufficiently represented in charges.38 The international criminal 
prosecutor is also a notable public and media figure, much more so than would 
typically be the case domestically, whose practices of confiding and granting 
interviews and issuing declarations considerably help him in channeling stigma 
strategically. 
It is the judges, however, who ultimately decide whether stigma will be 
confirmed through judgment. Moreover, one could argue that judges have a 
central role in guaranteeing the fairness of the attribution of stigma, for 
example by overseeing the fairness of the trial and ensuring that individuals are 
not convicted of offenses that do not adequately represent their level of 
responsibility. Moreover, judges may act as guardians of the relative 
exceptionality of stigma by ensuring that the ICC’s resources are used only to 
prosecute the worst crimes.39 
Beyond these strictly judicial actors in the allocation of stigma, there are a 
range of interveners competing to exercise influence on the court and trying to 
direct its stigma at certain targets. These include the UN Security Council, 
which can refer certain situations to the court; states, which can refer their own 
situations; and civil-society actors and victims, who can encourage the court to 
 
 38.  Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal 
Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162 (2005); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice without Politics? 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 584, 647 
(2006).  
 39.  Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Hans-Peter 
Kaul to Pre-Trial Chamber II’s Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Mar. 15, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1039485.pdf. 
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focus on certain individuals and certain crimes. For each of these interveners, 
stigma is part of different strategies linked to different agendas which may 
complement or contradict each other. 
For the Security Council, stigma of individuals, groups, or states via an ICC 
referral may be a way of judicially validating attempts to isolate certain regimes. 
A referral may even serve to prepare the political terrain for stronger measures, 
including the use of legitimized international violence. Those stigmatized are 
already outliers. A Security Council referral stigmatizes them both as threats to 
international peace and security and as potential criminals; that is, as threats to 
international order, law, and justice.40 It also stigmatizes particular types of 
behavior that have increasingly come to be seen as adverse to international 
peace and security. This was quite evident in the case of Libya where the 
Security Council did not mince its words in “[d]eploring the gross and 
systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful 
demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting 
unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian 
population made from the highest level of the Libyan government.”41 In 
exchange for referring situations to the court, the Security Council may hope 
that the ICC will judicially validate the stigma already arising from the 
“situation” referral by investigating, and then by prosecuting or convicting, 
particular individuals. 
States, for their part, lie at the center of stigmatization strategies, 
particularly through the medium of self-referrals, which have been described as 
“just a way for governments to use the ICC to further stigmatize their 
enemies.”42 This is particularly evident in the way self-referrals seek to direct 
the prosecutor’s attention towards certain crimes: those crimes that are 
committed more frequently by nonstate actors than by other states. For 
example, Uganda referred its own situation to the ICC not to delegitimize a 
state, but rather to delegitimize the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) by 
exposing the LRA to the ongoing stigma of crimes against humanity.43 More 
generally, the tendency to prosecute nonstate actors can be seen as part of 
broader efforts by states to stigmatize nonstate violence of any kind, while 
validating their monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It is telling in this 
respect that the ICC is sometimes at risk of turning into a machine to prosecute 
warlords. By contrast, state sponsors of criminal violence have so far 
 
 40.  Frédéric Mégret, ICC, R2P and the International Community’s Evolving Interventionist 
Toolkit, 21 FINN. YEARB. INT’L L. 21 (2010).  
 41.  S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2001). 
 42.  Discussion, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 763, 765 (2008) (remarks of Kenneth Roth, Executive 
Director, Human Rights Watch). 
 43.  PHILIPP KASTNER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN BELLO?: THE ICC BETWEEN 
LAW AND POLITICS IN DARFUR AND NORTHERN UGANDA 78 (2012). The LRA is a guerilla 
movement that has been active in Uganda since the 1980s and is widely suspected of having engaged in 
international crimes. Uganda’s surprising referral of its “own” situation to the ICC was widely 
understood as directed at the LRA and not itself. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, ‘Complementarity in 
Practice’: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L. FORUM 5, 10 (2008).  
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remarkably eluded sanction, in ways that suggest a deeper alignment of the 
interests of sovereigns and the ICC.44 
Civil society has long had a vested interest in the potential stigmatizing 
function of international criminal justice as a sort of broadly understood 
extension of its own ability to shame by referencing international-community 
standards. However, civil society is also intensely divided about what the stigma 
should be directed at. In effect, international criminal justice is a locus of rivalry 
between different groups competing to attract the highest possible stigma on a 
certain crime. Competing for the ICC’s attention both within and without are 
groups that focus on each core crime for their separate reasons, each with a 
particular structured view of what can go wrong in the world and what the worst 
crimes ought to be. For pacifists, aggression is the cardinal sin; for 
humanitarians, war crimes; for those inclined towards the protection of human 
rights, crimes against humanity; for those who seek to defend particular groups, 
genocide; and for feminists, sexual violence. Each of these various 
constituencies hopes that the prosecutor will bring their choice of charges, and 
that the judges will validate those charges. When a group’s crime of choice is 
never prosecuted, it sends a not-so-discreet signal that the crime is not quite as 
grave as others. Conversely, when a group’s crime is the only one selected for 
prosecution, particularly in a context where many other crimes could have been 
prosecuted, the ICC is giving the crime considerable symbolic recognition. 
Hence the prosecution of Lubanga for child recruitment (and for child 
recruitment only)45 in and by itself considerably elevated the stigma of child 
recruitment, whereas the failure by Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo to include 
sexual violence charges was seen as a major setback by others.46 
Finally, international criminal justice provides opportunities for victims to 
ascribe stigma. The presence of victims at the trial might be seen as in itself a 
factor of prior and ongoing stigmatization, in that the accused has to stand 
under the reproachful gaze of those who in all likelihood consider him or her to 
be the source of their harm. One is not only facing a hypothetical international 
community for a violation of its laws, but a very real community of suffering 
incarnated by victims. Of course, the presumption of innocence still legally 
protects the accused, but the presence of victims in the courtroom undeniably 
adds an element of confrontation and raises the moral stakes by reducing the 
degree of intermediation normally provided by a society’s organs of 
prosecution. The practice of victims at the ICC suggests that stigmatization is on 
their minds (indeed it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the victims would 
not seek to stigmatize the accused and his behavior). For example, when 
 
 44.  See Payam Akhavan, Self-Referrals Before the International Criminal Court: Are States the 
Villains or the Victims of Atrocities?, 21 CRIM. L. FORUM 103 (2010). 
 45.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Public Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ¶¶ 1–8 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.  
 46.  See, e.g., Trial Chamber I issues first trial Judgement of the ICC—Analysis of sexual violence in 
the Judgement, WOMEN’S INITIATIVES GEND. JUST. (May 2012), http://www.iccwomen.org/news/docs/ 
WI-LegalEye5-12-FULL/LegalEye5-12.html#2.  
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offered to present their concluding observations at the close of Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, victims focused insistently on the trauma and harm that they and 
others had suffered.47 Although some indicated that they would not pronounce 
on the length of the sentence, they did nonetheless indicate that it should 
include recognition of the gravity of the crimes, notwithstanding the defense’s 
attempt to minimize it.48 The fact that stigma is at stake is also reflected in 
efforts by the defense of Lubanga to exclude representations from victims from 
the determination of the sentence.49 
B. Timing 
Stigma is perhaps most decidedly a function of a conviction and a sentence. 
It is at this stage that the individual is branded as deviant, and the crime 
solemnly condemned. However, although the dominant legal understanding of 
stigma is that it should merely result from such a conviction, from a sociological 
point of view stigma does not wait that long and can arise long before or after, 
and relatively independently of, convictions. It does so, with increasing degrees 
of severity, as early as the investigation stage and during the actual trial. Even 
being a mere suspect before the ICC can lead to a degree of stigma, despite the 
presumption of innocence and the absence, contrary to the ad hoc tribunals,50 of 
an indictment procedure. The fact that preventive detention is frequently used 
ensures that individuals will be, socially at least, in a grey zone for as long as 
they are going through trial: Even being implicitly branded a flight risk includes 
some stigmatizing dimension. Appearing in the seat of the accused, the seat 
previously occupied by others who have been convicted, and having one’s 
picture taken and circulated the world over, framed by two square-jawed ICC 
security guards, already begins to shape the accused’s body as that of a convict 
en puissance, rather than as an innocent in the wrong place. 
In this context, local and international public opinions may not fully realize 
that preventive detention in no way prejudices the outcome of the trial. 
Moreover, the huge publicity surrounding prosecutions all but guarantees that 
some of the accused will bear significant negative shortfalls as a result of the 
 
 47.  See, e.g., Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Observations 
sur la fixation de la peine et les réparations de la part des victimes a/0001/06, a/0003/06, a/0007/06 
a/00049/06, a/0149/07, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0162/07, a/0149/08, a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, 
a/0407/08, a/0409/08, a/0523/08, a/0610/08, a/0611/08, a/0053/09, a/0249/09, a/0292/09, a/0398/09, et 
a/1622/10 (April 18, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1396912.pdf.  
 48.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Observations sur la peine pour le groupe de victimes 
V01, ¶ 7, (May 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1411251.pdf. 
 49.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Requête de la Défense aux fins de juger que seuls le 
Procureur et la Défense peuvent présenter des observations sur la peine à prononcer à l’encontre de M. 
Thomas Lubanga, (May 2, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1406845.pdf.  
 50.  The indictment procedure before the ad hoc tribunals was seen in some local communities as 
evidence that the “international system is unfair, or inferior to the domestic one, because it exposes 
individuals to the stigma of indictment for horrendous crimes before they are given the chance to 
respond to incriminating evidence and avert stigmatization.” Mirjan Damaška, What Is the Point of 
International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 348 n.31 (2008). 
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very fact of prosecutions.51 Commentators, pundits, journalists, politicians, and 
activists will typically not wait for the outcome of the trial to express opinions 
about the guilt of the accused. In the context of the ICC, the issuance of 
summonses against Kenyatta and Muthaura while Kenyan finance minister and 
cabinet secretary respectively is a good illustration of the tensions of being an 
accused while holding public office, both having had to resign their posts.52 
Of course, the stigma of prosecutions that do not result in conviction may 
wax and wane depending on the prosecutor’s conviction record. Also, as the 
broader public begins to acknowledge acquittal as a possible outcome of trials 
before the ICC, some of the stigmatizing charge may relent. Still, at least in the 
early stages of an international court’s activity, stigma is an inevitable by-
product of any prosecution. 
At all junctures, moreover, it is important to understand that there is a “long 
tail” of stigma, in that the courtroom is often only an echo chamber for various 
discussions—about guilt and responsibility, and also about peace, justice, and 
transition—that are occurring elsewhere. In other words, practices of 
stigmatization that may appear circumscribed in time by the trial in fact 
continue to manifest themselves far beyond the courtroom and long after the 
trial has ended, even as they may organize themselves around the particular 
stigmatizing outcomes that result from the trial. 
C. Methods 
One of the ways that stigma is typically attracted is by declarations made in 
the course of and at the culmination of trials. Indeed, the practices of 
international criminal justice are, fundamentally, logorrheic and hortatory, and 
involve the constant attempt to characterize situations and persons through the 
appropriate use of words. A careful study of the prosecution’s rhetoric shows 
how the trial is a constant theater of efforts to up the ante of moral indignation 
at the accused. It is as if the moral indignation behind the law needs to be 
constantly revived. As Durkheim notes, “A simple restitution of the troubled 
order would not suffice for us; we must have a more violent satisfaction. The 
force against which the crime comes is too intense to react with very much 
moderation.”53 
Pronouncing the words “genocide,” “crimes against humanity,” or “war 
crimes” in relation to a person’s name is of course already an exercise in 
inchoate stigmatization. However, prosecutorial practices typically go beyond 
bare legal allegations to include language that portrays the acts of the accused 
 
 51.  It is worth noting that in the domestic context, not releasing the identity of those prosecuted 
has been suggested as a way of reducing stigma that would be fairer to the accused. See NIGEL 
WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 162 (1980). 
 52.  Kenya ICC: Kenyatta Resigns From Finance Role, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012, 9:03 AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16745446. Kenyatta’s subsequent election in 2012 as president 
seems to have reemboldened Kenyans to reject the accusations leveled at him as politically motivated. 
 53.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 99–100. 
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as particularly horrendous, and rely on the ability to simultaneously monopolize 
a high degree of pathos (against the background of impeccable technical 
reasoning). The prosecutor’s opening and concluding statements are typically 
an attempt to brand the accused’s crime or crimes as particularly heinous. For 
example, in his opening statement in Prosecutor v. Bemba, the prosecutor 
emphasized that the acts of the accused were not “isolated” and that “the 
nature of the crimes . . . was unspeakable.”54 The prosecutor also stressed that 
the accused’s 
troops stole from the poor people of one of the poorest countries in the world. The 
massive rapes were not just sexually motivated, as gender crimes, they were crimes of 
domination [and] humiliation directed against women but also directed against men 
with authority. These crimes spread terror and devastated communities by means of 
the cheapest weapons and most available ammunition. Women were raped 
systematically to assert dominance and to shatter resistance. Men were raped in public 
to destroy their authority, their capacity to lead.
55
 
One of the ways that stigma is projected is through a systematic invocation of 
the continuing suffering of the victims. (After all, victims suffer not just at the 
moment of the crime, but to this day, and also in the future.) In other words, the 
evil of the accused’s act is not a spent force, but one whose effects will continue 
to be felt. Consider, for example, the following passage in the prosecutor’s 
opening statement in Lubanga: 
Hundreds of children still suffer the consequences of Lubanga’s crimes. They cannot 
forget what they suffered, what they saw, what they did. They were 9, 11, 13 years old. 
They cannot forget the beatings they suffered; they cannot forget the terror they felt 
and the terror they inflicted; they cannot forget the sounds of their machine guns; they 
cannot forget that they raped and that they were raped. Some of them are now using 
drugs to survive, some of them became prostitutes and some of them are orphaned 
and jobless.
56
 
It is of course hard to imagine a more severe indictment of the consequences 
that an individual’s acts can have on others. 
At any rate, acts do ultimately speak louder than words and stigma is 
perhaps above all a result of convictions. Sentencing and stigma have an 
intimate relationship, and as a rule of thumb the greater the sentence the 
greater the stigma. Although judges are typically careful not to say anything 
during the course of trial that might stigmatize an accused before conviction, 
sentencing itself is generally accompanied by further characterizations of the 
crime, beyond the issue of guilt or innocence. These further statements 
stigmatize certain types of behavior or even personal characteristics. In 
Lubanga, the only sentence before the ICC so far, the judges, although 
adopting neither the prosecutor’s level of rhetoric nor all of his suggestions, at 
 
 54.  Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Opening Statement, ¶ 4 (Nov. 22, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/30DF9EE7-E1F2-4407-BA21-D81D8C7A785C/282701/101122 
BembaProsecutorsOpeningStatementformatted.pdf. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Opening Statement, 2 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/89E8515B-DD8F-4251-AB08-6B60CB76017F/279630/ICCOTPSTLMO 
20090126ENG2.pdf.  
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least gave indications as to what factors they would consider in assessing the 
appropriate sentence. These included the gravity of the crimes (the chamber 
determined, on the basis of expert testimony about its consequences for those 
involved, that child recruitment was very grave), the large-scale and widespread 
nature of the crimes committed, and the degree of participation and intent of 
the convicted person.57 Potential aggravating circumstances included the 
punishment of child soldiers, sexual violence, commission against victims who 
were particularly defenseless, and the existence of a discriminatory motive.58 
The net effect of all of these factors was to further delineate the conditions 
under which stigmatization of an individual and his crimes will ensue. Earlier 
verdicts before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) had gone further in rhetorically consigning some of the accused to 
infamy.59 
III 
TARGETING STIGMA 
The nature of the stigma produced by international criminal proceedings is a 
fundamentally profound one, which threatens to put its targets (the criminal 
defendants) on the outer borders of humanity. It is the stigma, no less, of being 
an enemy of mankind, humanity’s constitutive “other.” For example, in the 
Lubanga case, the prosecutor alleged that the accused “committed some of the 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole: 
crimes against children.”60 Practices of stigmatization therefore also include, 
crucially, a number of implicit understandings about whom or what should be 
stigmatized. Stigmatization practices, when analyzed, reveal certain 
preconceptions about the worthy objects of stigma. These practices help 
construct a particular international society. The emphasis in most influential 
theories of criminal justice is on stigmatizing the accused. In part III.A, I discuss 
the accused as a target of stigma. However, a sociological approach to criminal 
justice would also emphasize the importance of stigmatizing particular crimes, 
as discussed in part III.B. Of course, whether the accused or a crime is the 
intended target of stigma, there is a risk that stigma will not easily be contained 
and that it will be spread beyond its intended target to various other entities, 
something that ICC practices may both seek to reduce and to render possible. 
Therefore, in part III.C, I address the risk that stigma will spread. 
 
 57.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, ¶¶ 36–56 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf. 
 58.  Id. ¶¶ 57–81.  
 59.  See Press Release, Trial Chamber, Radislav Krstić Becomes the First Person To Be Convicted 
of Genocide at the ICTY and Is Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment, ICTY Press Release 
OF/P.I.S./609e *Aug. 2, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7964 (emphasizing the accused’s evil). 
 60.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Opening Statement, ¶ 3 (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/89E8515B-DD8F-4251-AB08-6B60CB76017F/279630/ICCOTPSTLMO 
20090126ENG2.pdf  
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A. The Accused 
The selection of individuals to stand trial is the perhaps the set of ICC 
practices that is most prone to controversy and that remains most shrouded in 
mystery. The relatively diversified choices of prosecutors so far reflect a set of 
strategic preferences to stigmatize a sort of “representative sample” of potential 
international criminals, which includes military commanders, warlords and 
soldiers, as well as heads of state, and politicians. But, even as prosecutorial and 
adjudicatory practices stigmatize an ostensibly representative group of 
individual defendants, those same practices avoid stigmatizing the very 
structures for which the defendants act as agents. This helps sustain some of 
international criminal justice’s founding myths. 
For example, international criminal justice is based on the notion of 
individual guilt, and therefore on the need to particularly stigmatize individual 
behavior and decisions. It is through the stigmatization of individuals that one 
will avoid the stigmatization of entire communities and the notorious 
“Versailles stigma” that, through the so-called “war guilt clause,” branded all 
Germans as guilty of provoking World War I and, it is often argued, helped 
cause World War II.61 This concern is evident in writings about the ICC.62 Yet 
there is no reason to believe that individuals should be the preferred targets of 
stigma in all cases. If the acts of the individual can be attributed to some larger 
context, structure, or group, then the individual should be relatively less 
stigmatized; if, on the contrary, the acts can be seen as the individual’s alone, 
then he or she will incur relatively deeper stigmatization. There may be some 
cases where individuals are more the products of events and other cases where 
they are more the producers of those events. 
Although the practices of the ICC evidence the need to consign 
responsibility to the individual, they also demonstrate the difficulty of entirely 
abstracting responsibility from context. The relatively minor sentence of 
fourteen years imposed by the ICC on Thomas Lubanga,63 for example, might 
be explained by the fact that the latter was hardly the only person responsible 
for child-soldier recruitment during the Ituri conflict.64 As a result, even though 
he could certainly be legally blamed for the specific offense, he could hardly be 
stigmatized as being responsible for the entire phenomenon. And—although 
the particular practice of crafting indictments is generally an exercise in 
assigning blame to individuals, as opposed to groups or structures—overarching 
court practices that are too isolating might be seen as trivializing contextual 
 
 61.  ANTHONY P. ADAMTHWAITE, THE MAKING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 28 (2013). 
 62.  See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR POLICY & CONFLICT, BUILDING SUSTAINABLE PEACE THROUGH 
ENDING CYCLE OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 7 (2011), available at http://www.icpcafrica.org/ 
pdf/ICPC%20DRAFT%20POST%20PAPER%20ON%20PROSECUTION%20MECHANISMS%20
FOR%20POST-ELECTION%20VIOLENCE%20ATROCITIES.pdf (“The court can help avoid a 
collective stigma, by clearly identifying individuals responsible for crimes.”). 
 63.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, ¶ 107 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1438370.pdf. 
 64.  Id. ¶ 83.  
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responsibility. Thus the court’s practices, particularly its judgments, inevitably 
show an attention to the history and events leading to the commission of crimes, 
while still seeking to establish the accused’s “essential contribution.”65 If nothing 
else, the individual responsibility of most accuseds before the ICC will be 
interwoven with issues of characterization: for example, whether an armed 
conflict is international or noninternational.66 
Practices of stigmatization also reveal certain implicit and strategic 
assumptions about what types of behavior are most worth stigmatizing. Stigma 
can be increased by a high position despite relatively benign politics (as with 
Doenitz in the Nuremberg Trials comes),67 or by malevolent politics despite a 
relatively benign position (as with Streicher in the Nuremberg Trials).68 Stigma 
can be a function of personal participation in crimes, especially when it reveals 
a particular sadistic streak (Tadić before the ICTY comes to mind).69 But stigma 
is most likely to result from a position of high office. Those in positions of 
power have abused their positions in a way that resonates particularly badly 
with the human-rights ethos that undergirds much of international criminal 
justice. As the prosecutor put it emphatically in Bemba, 
The Prosecution will submit that as their superior, Jean-Pierre Bemba is even more 
responsible than the direct perpetrators, his subordinates. A commander that lets his 
troops carry out such criminal tactics is a hundred times more dangerous than any 
single rapist. Jean-Pierre Bemba knowingly let the 1,500 armed men he commanded 
and controlled commit hundreds of rapes, hundreds of pillages.
70
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) suggests 
that those in positions of power ought to be criminally liable even in situations 
where they are guilty mostly of negligence, as in the case of command 
responsibility.71 Few things have irked liberal-minded criminal lawyers more 
 
 65.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, passim 
(March 14, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.  
 66.  See id. ¶¶ 565–66. 
 67.  Karl Doenitz was a German admiral, who was briefly the head of the Third Reich after the 
death of Hitler. Although he commanded Germany’s submarine fleet during the war, he was never 
formally a Nazi party member. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, October 1, 1946, 41 
AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 332 (1947). 
 68.  Julius Streicher was an editor and prominent Nazi before the Second World War known for his 
intense anti-Semitism. However, he had been sidelined by the Nazi party from 1938 and occupied no 
significant position of power during the war. See id. 
 69.  Duško Tadić was the first person convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. A Bosnian Serb, he was a relatively minor figure in the events of the war, but was 
found to have been personally involved in a series of sadistic beatings. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf. 
 70.  Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Opening Statement, ¶ 6 (Nov. 22, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/30DF9EE7-E1F2-4407-BA21-
D81D8C7A785C/282701/101122BembaProsecutorsOpeningStatementformatted.pdf. 
 71.  Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court art. 28(a)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered 
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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than this move to strict liability in relation to major international crimes72: it 
betrays an international society that is willing to blur the line between human 
negligence and human evil. At any rate, strict liability puts a high onus on the 
commander or the governor in a way that presumes to create a certain social 
reality—one in which those concerned would be alert to the consequences of 
their acts—rather than to simply flow from that reality. 
There is a sense in which being selected for prosecution is in itself a mark of 
infamy because of the number of other people that could have been prosecuted. 
This excess of stigmatization is apparent in the Kenyan context,73 where the 
exact extent of individual stigmatization will partly depend on whether others 
are being prosecuted domestically for similar offenses or not. The possibility 
that those convicted by the ICC are scapegoats of sorts cannot be ignored. The 
stigma inflicted on those convicted by the court goes beyond their crime, and 
has to do with the fact that it is they who were selected to be prosecuted, 
suggesting to the world that there is something particularly emblematic, perhaps 
even particularly reprehensible, about their crimes. The Lubanga case is 
revealing in this respect. Although Lubanga’s name will almost certainly go 
down in history as the first person convicted internationally for recruiting 
children, he is hardly the only one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
beyond to have been involved in the practice. In a sense, he is therefore called 
upon to symbolically absorb the stigma of child recruitment for all who engage 
in it. The burden may come to be shared before international and domestic 
courts, but there is no doubt that Lubanga is exposed. A number of reactions 
from the accused or convicted are only understandable in this light, not 
necessarily as protestations of innocence but as strident questions to the effect 
of, Why me (of all people who might plausibly be accused)? 
B. Particular Crimes 
The true goal of stigmatizing practices in a Durkheimian framework should 
be to stigmatize the crimes themselves as forms of reprehensible deviancy, 
rather than the individuals as such. In that respect, the individual condemnation 
discussed in part III.A has an almost instrumental function rather than being an 
end in itself. Focusing now on the stigmatization of underlying crimes, one 
might argue that the ICC is a contested field, in which the relative importance 
of offenses in relation to each other is disputed or negotiated. Although 
references to “core crimes” and the stabilizing effects of the law suggest a high 
degree of consensus about these offenses, their relative gravity or even the 
 
 72.  See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
455, 480–81 (2001); George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of 
Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 539, 550 (2005); Darryl Robinson, The Identity 
Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 925 (2008).  
 73.  See, e.g., Stop Stigma Against ICC Suspects, DAILY NATION (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Stop-stigma-against-ICC-suspects/-/440808/1644738/-/1hksvgz/-
/index.html (Kenya). 
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reasons for their gravity are intensely disputed issues,74 behind which lie 
struggles about the meaning of the field of international criminal law and the 
ability and authority to define it. In effect, the ICC’s practices suggest particular 
agendas at work to prioritize, by necessity, the stigmatization of certain offenses 
over others. In Lubanga, the prioritization of the child-recruitment crime over 
all other offenses (including, notably, sexual violence) could be seen as a way of 
using the scarce resources of the court to “upgrade” that international crime, 
which had arguably been neglected historically.75 
An overview of the stigmatizing thrust of the ICC in its first ten years 
suggests that an international society is both struggling to emerge through the 
practices of ICC actors and being retro-projected by the court’s stigmatizing 
practices. Reviewing the court’s stigmatizing practices also suggests the precise 
nature of this burgeoning international society. 
First, the nature of the international society is suggested by the very subject-
matter jurisdiction of the ICC, which reserves stigma for a small subset of 
offenses. In particular, the ICC is notable for a particularly forceful 
condemnation of “atrocity crimes” in the form of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.76 As a result, the society that emerges is one that 
singles out public crimes of explicit armed violence at the expense of other 
forms of violence that are not so stigmatized.77 
Second, the nature of international society is also suggested by the 
normative ordering of international crimes, the designation of what the society 
most abhors. This ordering indicates that international society is truly a society 
insofar as it is capable of sophisticated differentiations between levels of evil or 
blameworthiness.78 A society that would put an isolated war crime on par with 
conspiracy to commit genocide on a vast scale, for example, would not be much 
of a society. Hierarchy in stigma, therefore, also reflects international criminal 
justice’s expressivist ambition. 
The ordering of crimes over time tells us something crucial about what is 
most stigmatized in a given configuration of the international order. At the 
Nuremberg Trials, interstate crimes against peace were described by the court 
as “the supreme international crime[s].”79 Sixty years later, one might argue that 
the crime of aggression (a corollary of crimes against peace insofar as it is also 
 
 74.  See Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law, 
51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583, 583 (2002).  
 75.  See Justin Coleman, Showing Its Teeth: The International Criminal Court Takes on Child 
Conscription in the Congo, But Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite, 26 PENN STATE INT. L. REV. 765, 781 
(2007). 
 76.  David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREV. 229 (2006). 
 77.  Frédéric Mégret, The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment, 36 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 195, 211 (2011). 
 78.  See Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal 
Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 489–500 (2001). 
 79.  1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 421 (1947), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf. 
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an interstate crime) now suffers from a much more hesitant opprobrium. 
Although the Assembly of States Parties eventually and after much controversy 
managed to find a particular regime for the crime of aggression, so many 
controversies and caveats surround its implementation80 as to suggest the 
offence’s descent into decadence. The international society of 1998 or 2011 is 
evidently not that of 1945, when interstate crimes against peace seemed to 
condition all else. Without going into the details, this reflects the relative 
downgrading of the interstate component of the international legal system, not 
to mention the significant softening of the prohibition on the use of force that is 
apparent in a context of repeated exceptions, extensive interpretations, and 
superpower hegemony.81 
By contrast, the ICC’s inception marks the culmination of the rise of 
genocide as the “crime of crimes.”82 This evolution began with the creation of 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, a process that demoted aggression 
for the benefit of a more cosmopolitan vision of the worst international crimes. 
Genocide has become the most visibly stigmatized crime in international 
criminal justice. As Paul Behrens has argued, 
[T]he crime in its codified form carries a stigma that goes far beyond that attached to 
ordinary offenses and possibly beyond that which other international crimes carry. It is 
‘condemned by the civilized world’. It ‘shocks the conscience of mankind’, and its 
punishment and prevention endorse ‘the most elementary principles of morality.’
83
 
More generally, the emphasis on crimes against humanity as the worst crimes 
suggests an international society that is much more willing to see crimes that 
occur domestically in times of “peace” as extremely grave. In other words, 
international crimes are increasingly influenced by a cosmopolitan vision of 
international society, one in which mass rights violations are considered to be 
the worst offenses.84 
By contrast, war crimes—despite all their ostensible inherent gravity—are 
perhaps the least stigmatized. There may be several reasons for this, one of 
them being that “armed conflict is regulated but not proscribed by international 
law, whereas mass atrocities are outlawed as crimes.”85 Mass atrocities represent 
particularly “stigmatized behavior that has been condemned by the 
international community,” whereas war crimes do not.86 In other words, war 
crimes are a form of excess within a framework of otherwise legal violence. This 
 
 80.  Sean D. Murphy, The Crime of Aggression at the ICC, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE 
OF FORCE (Marc Weller ed.) (forthcoming 2014). 
 81.  See Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1117 
(2009). 
 82.  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2000).  
 83.  Paul Behrens, The Need for a Genocide Law, in ELEMENTS OF GENOCIDE 237, 239 (Paul 
Behrens & Ralph Henham eds., 2013). 
 84.  See DAVID HIRSH, LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE: COSMOPOLITAN TRIALS (2012). 
 85.  OXFORD INST. FOR ETHICS, LAW & ARMED CONFLICT, POLICY BRIEF: OPERATIONALIZING 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT 5 (2012), available at http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/ 
elac%20operationalising%20the%20responsibility%20to%20prevent.pdf.  
 86.  Id. 
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sets war crimes apart from genocide and crimes against humanity, which are 
ipso facto illegal. There may also be more sympathy overall for war crimes 
committed in difficult circumstances, in the “fog of war.” This sympathy 
disappears entirely when, for example, a sovereign systematically targets an 
innocent population. 
Various strategies of stigmatization are organized around the hierarchical 
sliding scale of stigma (however rough and imperfect that scale is). Thus, groups 
vying for recognition of their cause will, for example, first seek to have the 
harms committed against them recognized as genocide, or, if not that, as crimes 
against humanity, or at the very least as war crimes. This was evident in Darfur 
where so much seemed to hinge on whether genocide had been committed.87 
The struggle for stigma status is also evident in various strategies to fit sexual 
violence within the upper tiers of international criminal law. The ability to peg 
sexual violence to the most stigmatizing offense is often understood as a 
measure of success, whether the offense is a broad one (war crimes88 or, notably, 
genocide89) or a narrow one (the various constitutive offenses of war crimes that 
could encompass rape, for example). 
C. Other Entities? 
Beyond individuals and actual crimes, the stigmatizing logic of the ICC also 
affects other entities in a variety of ways. It typically does so indirectly and 
unwittingly. The ICC hesitates to stigmatize other entities directly out of fear 
that individuals will seek to escape the stigma of their own condemnation by 
ascribing responsibility to some overarching entity or structure. Nonetheless, 
stigma (as opposed to conviction per se) is in practice difficult to contain, and 
much broader messages are being channeled via the ICC’s practices than those 
that relate strictly to individuals taken out of their social context. 
Perhaps the most evident indirect target of stigma is none other than the 
states themselves. Because that stigma is of course indirect, one will search in 
vain for specific admonishments of states. However, a head of a state and the 
state itself are frequently so proximate that stigma channeled at the former will 
 
 87.  See Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101 
(2004) (arguing that designation as genocide has become regrettably central to triggering humanitarian 
intervention). 
 88.  See generally Christin B. Coan, Rethinking the Spoils of War: Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 183 
(2000) (analyzing the treatment of rape by the ICTY); Patricia H. Davis, The Politics of Prosecuting 
Rape as a War Crime 34 INT’L L. 1223 (2000) (discussing the political barrier to prosecuting rape as a 
war crime); Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 277 
(2002) (considering the broadening of categories of international crime under which gender crimes may 
be prosecuted). 
 89.  See generally Chile Eboe-Osuji, Rape as Genocide: Some Questions Arising, 9 J. GENOCIDE 
RES. 251 (2007) (discussing rape as an act of genocide); Frances Pilch, Rape as Genocide, in PLIGHT 
FATE WOMEN GENOCIDE 169 (Samuel Totten ed., 2009) (considering the inclusion of rape as a war 
crime at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of 
Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 350 (2003) (discussing rape as an act of genocide in the context of 
Rwanda).  
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inevitably have repercussions for the latter.90 In the ICC context, the indictment 
of Omar Al Bashir and several high-ranking Sudanese officials clearly conveys a 
not-so-subtle message about the Sudanese state’s role in the Darfur conflict. 
Moreover, heads of state will often seek to portray accusations leveled against 
them personally as attacks on their nations themselves. Indeed, beyond the 
state, entire collectivities (for example, “the people” or “the nation”) may be 
stigmatized. In the ICTY context, for example, Croats frequently complained of 
the “stigma Hrvatska” (Croatian stigma).91 The accusation that Croats had 
committed war crimes in obtaining independence, such that the national project 
was compromised from day one as a result of ethnic cleansing, went to the heart 
of that young nation’s self-understanding.92 
Another clear way that states are stigmatized is by being portrayed as 
“unwilling or unable” to carry out an investigation or prosecution, such that the 
underlying case is admissible before the ICC (pursuant to article 17 of the 
Rome Statute).93 States designated as unwilling or unable are highlighted not 
only as cradles of potential international criminals but also, more pointedly 
perhaps, as malfunctioning, failed cogs that disrupt the mechanics of 
international criminal justice. Although only an issue of case admissibility is 
technically at stake, it is not hard to see how an admissibility finding comes 
dangerously close to a finding that the relevant state is responsible for violating 
an obligation to try or extradite suspected criminals (unless the admissibility 
arises on other grounds, such as state referral or failure to contest). It may even 
suggest that the state is effectively endorsing the crimes in question. Many 
individuals came to this conclusion in the Kenyan context. As the Kenyan Vice 
President Kalonzo Musyoka put it, “An indictment by the ICC carries with it a 
certain stigma, a lot of stigma, and gives the impression that a country is in the 
category of a failed state. Kenya is not in that category.”94 Hence ICC 
indictments and condemnations do tend to have multiple ricochet effects on 
states, stigmatizing them indirectly as substantively or procedurally delinquent. 
Beyond the state, though, the ICC may have a more complex role in 
ascribing stigma to certain communities, ethnic or political. This is because in 
practice, and especially in many contemporary internecine conflicts, individuals 
will be seen less in their individual capacity than as members of their 
communities. This was evident in the former Yugoslavia, for example, where 
 
 90.  André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility 
in International Law, 52 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 615 (2003). 
 91.  James Hopkin, Croatia Starts to Hope Again, as a “War Crime” Stigma Is Lifted, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 20, 2012, 7:11 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/20/croatia-war-crime-
stigma-lifted. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Rome Statute, supra note 71, at art. 17 (“The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible 
where . . . [t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by the State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”). 
 94.  Kenya Wins African Support to Defer ICC Prosecutions, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-wins-african-support-to-defer-icc-prosecutions-114375004/ 
157290.html. 
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public opinion was less concerned about the responsibility and fate of 
individuals than about the ratio of indictees within each community.95 Although 
these communities are supposed to escape stigma through the device of 
individualized responsibility, they can end up being stigmatized, or feeling as if 
they are. In the ICC context, the relative stigmatization of entire communities 
has emerged not only from the inherent selectivity of prosecutions—which 
almost always makes it seem as if certain communities are more to blame than 
others—but also from the court’s practices in terms of assessing who is a 
“rightful” victim. In the Lubanga case, one of the questions was whether the 
Hema community or its individual members should benefit from reparations, 
that is, whether they could be conceived as “victims” of Lubanga.96 The legal 
representative of the victims did not hesitate to emphasize that, although the 
Hema community did suffer from having some of its youth recruited as child 
soldiers, a significant proportion of the community also supported those 
responsible for their recruitment.97 
IV 
RECEIVING STIGMA 
To be prosecuted by the ICC is in a sense a double stigma: The substantive 
charge imposes stigma, but so does the fact that one is being tried by the ICC, a 
body that presents itself as an emanation of mankind. ICC prosecutions carry 
particular stigma given their highly selective character and the attendant belief, 
apparent from public opinion, that the prosecutor “must be pretty sure” of her 
case to have selected a particular defendant. To be selected by the ICC 
prosecutor in the tribunal’s early years is also a guarantee that one will go down 
in history, alongside the Tadićs, Akayesus, and Lubangas of this world, as one 
of the first people to be tried before the ICC. This stigma’s significance is 
perhaps underlined by the rarity of any dialogue about rehabilitation as a 
potential prospect for those convicted.98 It is as if the accumulated weight of the 
stigma compromises the ability of any individual to ever atone for it within a 
lifetime.99 
The effects of ICC-imposed stigma are difficult to project because the ICC 
does not dictate those effects. For stigma to become part of the reinforcement 
 
 95.  Frédéric Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its Actors and Observers, 3 
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 1013, 1041 (2011).  
 96.  Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the Principles and 
Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, ¶ 51–53 (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc1447971.pdf.  
 97.  Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Observations sur la fixation de la peine et les réparations 
de la part des victimes, ¶ 15–17 (April 18, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1396912.pdf.  
 98.  See Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 64, 69 (2003) (emphasizing that although rehabilitation is mentioned as one of the goals of 
international sentencing, the latter is hardly theorized in the ICTY’s and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’s jurisprudence). 
 99.  This is not to say that some degree of rehabilitation is not possible and that some individuals 
have not over time recovered from the stigma of international prosecutions or convictions. 
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of social bonds—to play a role in the constitution of society—it must to a 
degree be accepted by the society it addresses. In other words, criminal justice 
alone cannot produce stigma without some social relay. Criminal justice only 
gives the signal for a reaction that must ultimately be collective. There is 
certainly evidence that prosecutions and, a fortiori, convictions will lead to 
some degree of social shunning. It has been argued, for example, that 
“[s]tigmatizing delinquent leaders through indictment, as well as apprehension 
and prosecution, undermines their influence.”100 There is also hope that 
stigmatization will facilitate transitional justice processes.101 It is probably too 
early to determine whether Lubanga or child-soldier recruitment (in the best of 
cases) have become more stigmatized as a result of ICC practices, although that 
is not implausible. 
However, there is also reason to be skeptical of too linear a vision of the 
operation of stigma, because the effects of criminal justice are distorted and 
twisted by the operation of the international realm and the complexity of their 
reception. In particular, a truly agentic approach to practices of international 
criminal justice must emphasize the degree to which the overall level of stigma 
in any given case is also affected by the way in which its targets react to it, 
whether by acknowledging and accepting it or by rejecting it individually or 
collectively. International criminal justice, needless to say, is also written by the 
accused and convicted and their defense counsel, as well as the societies that are 
supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of its realizations. 
A. Acknowledgment 
The operation of stigma presupposes a somewhat unitary social sphere, one 
in which a particular “conscience collective” manifests itself to stigmatize 
certain crimes.102 In the domestic context, the accused or convicted are surely a 
part of this “conscience collective.” Although the domestically accused may 
vigorously deny the facts, claim their innocence, or insist that a punishment is 
too harsh, their challenge to the operation of the criminal-justice system is not 
one that denies it the power to assign stigma altogether, or that fundamentally 
disagrees that the crimes they are accused of ought to be stigmatized. In fact, 
the domestic accuseds’ denials of guilt reinforce the sense that these accused do 
not wish to be the targets of a legitimate effort to assign stigma. The exception 
here is quite rare, manifested in the figure of the “rebel outlaw” who challenges 
the ability and rightfulness of society to stigmatize his behavior.103 
 
 
 100.  Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2001). 
 101.  Juan E. Méndez, National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal 
Court, 15 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 25, 32 (2001). 
 102.  DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY, supra note 2, at 84.  
 103.  For an exploration of the “rebel outlaw” in the context of offences against property, see 
EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, 
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010). 
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By contrast, those stigmatized by international criminal justice have at times 
manifested an attempt to overthrow the dominant legal order. The Third Reich 
comes to mind as a project that thought of itself not (only) as one of norm 
transgression, but of fundamentally reconstituting the norms of the 
international order in its own image.104 There are many examples of 
international criminals mounting vigorous challenges to the ability of 
international criminal tribunals to stigmatize them, from Hermann Göring to 
Slobodan Milosevic.105 In conditions of extreme social, psychological, and moral 
polarity, where, as the saying goes, one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter (and one man’s dictator is another’s liberator), the very project of 
international criminal justice may be put in question. 
This contrast between the international and the domestic, however, must be 
tempered. Even among the Nuremberg defendants, many were arguably more 
interested in defending their individual innocence than in mounting a radical 
ideological challenge to the liberal and humanitarian values that dominate the 
tribunal. Indeed, it has been pointed out that dispensation of stigma, if it is done 
in conditions that appear fair over time, may “suck in” the defendants into a 
grudging form of cooperation with, ultimately, their own stigmatization.106 Many 
of the accused that the ICC has dealt with so far probably do not seek to 
overthrow the international legal order. Theirs are crimes of hate, cynicism, or 
avidity (folly even), but they are not necessarily anchored in an articulated 
alternative vision of society, one based on a radical exaltation of violence, for 
example. In that respect, Lubanga provided the ICC with an ideal first 
conviction: someone who strenuously denied that he had been knowingly 
involved in the recruitment of child soldiers107 and thus seemed to be conceding 
the very rationale of international criminal justice’s stigmatizing effort, namely 
the social evil of that offense. The corresponding bodily practices suggest 
docility, deference, acceptance of the authority of the judges, an emphasis on 
factual denegation or relatively arcane legal points as a defense, and “playing by 
the rules.” 
Indeed, all of the accused appearing before the ICC seem to have implicitly 
acknowledged that there are such things as the international crimes of which 
they are accused. They merely insist that they are not guilty of the crimes. They 
appear before the court as innocents, rather than as challengers; or—even as 
 
 104.  See Detlev F. Vagts, International Law in the Third Reich, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 661 (1990). 
 105.  A rather fascinating psychological study of this phenomenon can be found in Jerrold M. Post 
& Lara K. Panis, Tyrrany on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct of Defendants Slobodan 
Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 823 (2005). And Lydwine Helly observes that 
Milosevic’s attitude at trial corresponded precisely to “la défence de la rupture” as made famous by 
Jacques Vergès. L’APARTHEID JUDICIAIRE: LE TRIBUNAL PÉNAL INTERNATIONAL ARME DE 
GUERRE (Pierre Marie Gallois & Jacquer Vergès eds., 2002) (Fr.).  
 106.  GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL 
JUSTICE 203 (2000). 
 107.  Wairagala Wakabi, Lubanga’s Defense Opening Statement – Witnesses Lied, Lubanga is Not 
Guilty, LUBANGA TRIAL (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/01/27/lubangas-defense-
opening-statement-witnesses-lied-lubanga-is-not-guilty/. 
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they challenge the court itself—they rarely challenge the crimes as such. 
Today’s ethnic cleanser is more likely to ascribe blame to others, to 
recharacterize crimes against humanity as armed conflict or counterinsurgency, 
or to simply deny that he was there than he is to challenge the existence of a 
global corpus of offenses or even the court itself. There is evidence of a 
surprising degree of cooperation with the ICC, as when the six individuals 
accused by the ICC prosecutor in Kenya decided to respond to the court’s 
summons.108 In that respect, ICC practices, including the conduct of defendants 
themselves before the court, do seem to reflect the gradual normalization of 
international criminal-law discourse as a set of stigmatized motifs, which 
delineate a paradoxical community of values between accused and accuser. 
There are also well-documented examples of a more open recognition by 
defendants of the validity of the stigma directed at them. At Nuremberg109 and 
before the ICTY,110 this recognition lead to forms of soul-searching and even 
repentance. Even though the ICC has not yet had a great repentant, there is no 
doubt that contrition would be a powerfully validating force, for court as much 
as victim. 
B. Defiance 
Historically, however, the accused will not always be crushed by stigma and 
there has been a distinct pattern of reacting with overwhelming defiance and 
attempting to inflict counterstigma on the accuser (the international 
community). Even though, as has been seen, those accused may not challenge 
the very idea of international criminal justice, this does not mean that they take 
the stigma directed at them easily, or that they do not challenge international 
criminal tribunals’ authority to be the distributors of that stigma. Attacks 
against international criminal justice by the accused have often been strong and 
sustained, all the more so because they are often collective. For example, 
Hermann Göring111 and Slobodan Milosevic112 lambasted the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the ICTY respectively as unjust courts that had little 
understanding for history or authority to condemn them. 
More recently, the critique that the ICC has exclusively focused on Africans, 
implicitly or explicitly stigmatizing the court as racist, has of course proved to be 
a powerful plank in counterstigmatizing strategies: What credit, indeed, should 
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Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777 (2003).  
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 11 (2007). 
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be attached to the stigmatizing messages of an international institution that is 
itself the subject of reproach?113 In cases where the stigma of international 
prosecutions cannot entirely be countered on the world stage, defendants and 
convicts may engage in strategies of martyrdom, accepting their fate before 
international criminal justice but only as a way of enhancing their status with 
local audiences.114 
Narratives of stigmatization before the ICC must therefore take into 
account the agency of those accused or convicted and their ability to put up a 
resistance against the international criminal-justice system’s attempts to 
ostracize them. The ability of the accused or convicted to counteract stigma will 
depend on the availability of a strong alternative narrative to the one proposed 
by the ICC and, perhaps most of all, on the strength of communal and political 
ties. In that respect, it is fair to say that someone like Omar Al-Bashir has done 
reasonably well in neutralizing some of the stigma attached to his prosecution 
by enlisting support both at home and abroad. For example, Al-Bashir has 
sought to counterstigmatize the ICC as a neocolonial institution, thus using the 
fact of his prosecution to his advantage.115 Although his success in doing so may 
be limited on the global plane, it has not been insignificant in Africa and is 
undoubtedly part of the African Union’s turnaround vis-à-vis the court.116 
C. Uncooperative Societies? 
One of the assumptions of Durkheimian stigmatization theory seems to be 
that the source and recipient of stigma are essentially the same society, so that 
the stigmatizing message will be received more or less unmodified by the society 
at which it is targeted.117 The problem in the international context is of course 
that “international society” is a “society of societies,” one whose messages must 
in practice cross borders to be heard locally and that does not perfectly coincide 
with the recipient societies. In fact, the very challenge of international criminal 
justice is that it is not always clear which society its operation is supposed to 
invigorate (whether international or domestic society). In this context, the 
difficulty for the ICC is not only that not all the accused and convicted accept 
their share of the stigma but, perhaps more interestingly from a sociological 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Udo Froese, Raping Africa Through the ICC, S. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/news_article.php?id=8862&title=Raping%20Africa%20through%
20the%20ICC; but see David Smith, New Chief Prosecutor Defends International Criminal Court, 
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2012, 9:12 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2012/may/23/chief-prosecutor-
international-criminal-court. 
 114.  KATHARINA VON KELLENBACH, THE MARK OF CAIN: GUILT AND DENIAL IN THE POST-
WAR LIVES OF NAZI PERPETRATORS 112–37 (2013).  
 115.  See Sudan’s Bashir Blasts ICC’s ‘New Face of Colonisation,’ FRANCE 24 (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20130527-african-union-icc-justice-sudan-bashir-kenya-kenyatta. 
 116.  Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande & Max Du Plessis, Assessing the African Union Concerns 
About Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 AFR. J. LEG. STUDS. 5 
(2011). 
 117.  In Durkheim’s work, the reference is exclusively national societies, and it is the strength of 
such societies that the assertion of criminal law reinforces.  
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perspective, that not all societies will accept that they should be relays of that 
stigma. 
Even though some ICC cases result in broad local social support for the 
stigmatization of certain behavior,118 stigmatization efforts nonetheless still 
require careful calibration. The ICC’s stigmatization efforts can backfire if they 
are heavy-handed in relation to the actual behavior or to domestic perceptions. 
For example, Damaška has expressed fear that stigma will be ineffective if 
applied “not only [to] truly reprehensible individuals but also [to] those who are 
only marginally culpable,” where “to treat the latter as perpetrators of the most 
heinous crimes imaginable strikes ordinary people as too harsh or morally 
obtuse.”119 He cautions against the “dilution of the disgrace of convictions for 
grossly inhuman acts.”120 It is unclear at this stage whether ICC prosecutorial 
practices run this risk, but it bears mentioning that public opinion in Ituri seems 
to suggest anxiety over the opposite possibility, namely that Lubanga was 
prosecuted for lesser charges (child soldier recruitment) than he could and 
arguably should have been (killing of civilians, systematic sexual violence, and 
so forth).121 
Even so, in cases where the legitimacy and authority of international 
criminal tribunals are shaky, attempts to point the finger at those accused may 
backfire by endowing them with a heroic sort of status. This occurred in the 
former Yugoslavia, where new governments either stood by the accused, or 
gave them a hero’s farewell, as well as a hero’s welcome when they came back 
from the ICTY.122 This tendency has also been evident in the ICC context where 
the attempt to stigmatize leaders like Al Bashir, Kenyatta, or Gbagbo has been 
resisted either in part or in whole by local societies, and where the status of the 
accused may even have been enhanced.123 In these scenarios, the ICC can 
become counterstigmatized, in a sense, as alien or arbitrary. 
Thus, international criminal justice is probably most useful in contexts 
where local societies are likely to relay the international stigma. Historical 
breakdowns in the “stigma chain” (for example, between the Tokyo Tribunal 
and post–World War II Japan) have not necessarily nullified the impact of 
 
 118.  For example, as many as sixty percent of Kenyans were at one point said to support the ICC 
prosecutor’s bringing charges against those who became known as the “Ocampo Six.” Kenyans Want 
the Ocampo Six Tried in Hague, DAILY NATION (Dec. 24, 2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/ 
Kenyans-want--Ocampo-Six-tried-in-Hague-/-/1064/1078458/-/hnw0vh/-/index.html (Kenya). 
 119.  Damaška, supra note 50, at 351. 
 120.  Id. at 353. 
 121.  INT’L REFUGEE RIGHTS INITIATIVE & APRODIVI-ASBL, STEPS TOWARDS JUSTICE, 
FRUSTRATED HOPES: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT IN ITURI 13–14 (2012), available at http://www.refugee-rights.org/Assets/PDFs/2012/ 
StepsTowardJusticeFinal.pdf. 
 122.  See, e.g., Enis Zebic et al., Croatian Joy, Serbian Anger at Gotovina Acquittal, INST. FOR WAR 
& PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 19, 2012), http://iwpr.net/report-news/croatian-joy-serbian-anger-gotovina-
acquittal.  
 123.  See, e.g., Jess Kyle, Kenya’s ICC Withdrawal: The Wrong Face for ICC-Africa Relationship 
Debates, JURIST (Oct. 8, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/10/jess-kyle-icc-kenya.php.  
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international verdicts but have dampened that impact.124 Conversely, continuity 
in the stigma chain has magnified the stigma attached to those convicted, as in 
Rwanda, for example, where the state and the international community’s 
stigmatizing goals have been broadly aligned.125 The ICC is always at risk of 
over- or understigmatizing behavior from a domestic point of view: There will 
be those who argue, for example, that Lubanga’s conviction for recruiting child 
soldiers overburdened the man and made too much of a lone offense. Lubanga 
is thus a bit more likely to be seen as an expiatory victim of international 
criminal justice, and the stigma resulting from his conviction as attaching to the 
operation of an artificial international society (rather than Congolese or Iturian 
societies). On the other hand, there will also be those who will argue that 
certain crimes or certain individuals are curiously escaping stigma. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Practices of stigmatization at the ICC are rich and complex. Stigma is 
attached, intentionally or not, to the accused and, a fortiori, to the convicted. 
Practices of stigmatization reveal the significance of stigma and the ongoing 
competition to assign it. Stigma may have some broad consequences, whether 
intended or unintended. It certainly seems to be the case that stigma is difficult 
to contain: Stigma is always at risk of extending beyond its more immediate 
targets. The fact remains that getting the right balance of stigma is a condition 
of the authority and legitimacy of international criminal justice, and thus 
ultimately of its efficacy and sustainability. Practices of stigmatization reveal the 
never-ending struggle to neither over- nor understigmatize, in ways that sustain 
the credibility and success of the international criminal-justice enterprise both 
domestically and internationally. 
Beyond this, it seems that the emphasis on stigma as a principal function of 
international criminal justice can help us reformulate questions about the 
nature of the ICC’s practices in at least three ways. 
First, the emphasis on stigma allows us to think about the goals and impact 
of international criminal justice as they emerge through repeated practices of 
key actors. Because for Durkheim the target of the criminal law is not the 
criminals but society’s law-abiding elements, the sociology of stigma helps us 
move beyond somewhat tired debates about whether international criminal 
 
 124.  See MADOKA FUTAMURA, WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: THE 
TOKYO TRIAL AND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY 68–86 (2007). 
 125.  The Rwandan government has been broadly committed to an agenda of punishing the 
perpetrators of genocide and as a result, even though it has had its differences with the international 
community, the stigma of convictions by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is likely to be 
carried over into Rwandan society. If anything, the government and Rwandan public opinion have 
occasionally deplored that the tribunal did not sufficiently stigmatize those involved in the genocide. 
Kinglsey Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Cimes Justice: External Perceptions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 28–30 (2002).  
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justice has a protective or deterrent power.126 Instead, it forces us to think more 
about how criminal justice consolidates expectations of the “normal.” If the 
goal is less to deter criminals as such than to reinforce the international 
community’s sense of self, then does the ICC achieve this goal, and if so how 
would we know it? A stigma-based approach would recommend that we look 
for the impact of international criminal justice far beyond the immediate 
operation of the ICC, in the reinforcement of some sort of global “conscience 
collective.” It is an understatement to say that measuring such a conscience is an 
arduous and problematic task. Certainly, though, it can be conceded that, 
through the rise of international criminal justice, a social element is struggling 
to express itself. Even a relatively ineffective international criminal-justice 
system (ineffective in terms of the number of people it can arrest, prosecute, 
and convict) might be a socially significant tool if its stigmatizing signals end up 
shaping international society. Although the doctrine of international criminal 
justice is often seen as based on developments over the last decades in 
international human rights and international humanitarian law, there is no 
doubt that the stigmatizing thrust of international criminal justice in turn helps 
reinforce the sense that the relevant norms have now become entrenched. 
Second, focusing on stigma as the ICC’s most central function can also help 
us problematize the court’s efficacy relative to other transitional mechanisms of 
international criminal justice. If stigma is indeed important and the court is less 
about sanction than about shaming, then this makes its claim to specificity less 
strong. Alternative modes of transition—be they truth commissions or 
traditional justice—are arguably just as if not more effective at shaming.127 For 
example, these mechanisms allocate stigma in ways that are more community-
based and diffuse. As Linda Keller put it, alternative justice mechanisms have 
“the ability to reach more than the select few, but preserve the stigma of 
punishment by incorporating local beliefs and customs as accountability 
measures for a larger number of offenders.”128 The inability of the ICC to speak 
quite the language of stigma spoken within given societies is an argument in 
favor of translating international stigma (something to which outreach efforts 
by the tribunals are dedicated). Comparing stigmatizing practices in 
international criminal justice and in various institutions of transitional justice 
may yield interesting insights as to the role that stigma serves in each context, 
and how it is more or less well served by its practitioners. 
Third and finally, the focus on stigma can help us to think more creatively 
about the relationship of international criminal justice to power. International 
criminal justice has the power not only to convict a few distinct individuals but 
 
 126.  See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 100 (discussing whether international criminal justice prevents 
future atrocities). 
 127.  See ROBERT I. ROTBERG & DENNIS THOMPSON, TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS 16, 25, 82, 100, 103, 164 (2010).  
 128.  Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan 
Alternative Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 271 (2007). 
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to stigmatize entire types of deviancy and, in the process, to help constitute a 
“normal” international society. The ability to control decisions about what ends 
up being stigmatized is thus absolutely central to the constitution of the 
international system, and points to the potentially ideological and partial nature 
of certain practices before international tribunals. The question is not only 
whether an international society exists, but which international society exists, 
and how it is constituted by the stigmatizing practices of a court. Here, the ICC 
prosecutor and judges appear to wield considerable power as the ultimate 
arbiters of an international order of stigma. 
 
